Introduction
This is a sequel to our article \Predicative foundations of arithmetic" (1995) , referred to in the following as PFA]; here we review and clarify what was accomplished in PFA], present some improvements and extensions, and respond to several challenges. The classic challenge to a program of the sort exempli ed by PFA] was issued by Charles Parsons in a 1983 paper, subsequently revised and expanded as Parsons (1992) . Another critique is due to Daniel Isaacson (1987) . Most recently, Alexander George and Daniel Velleman (1996) have examined PFA] closely in the context of a general discussion of di erent philosophical approaches to the foundations of arithmetic.
The plan of the present paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the notions and results of PFA], in a bit less formal terms than there and without the supporting proofs, and presents an improvement communicated to us by Peter Aczel. Then Section 2 elaborates on the structuralist perspective which guided PFA]. It is in Section 3 that we take up the challenge of Parsons. Finally, Section 4 deals with the challenges of George and Velleman, and thereby, that This paper was written while the rst author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford, CA) whose facilities and support, under grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the National Science Foundation, have been greatly appreciated.
of Isaacson as well. The paper concludes with an appendix by Geo rey Hellman, which veri es the predicativity, in the sense of PFA], of a suggestion credited to Michael Dummett for another de nition of the natural number concept.
Review
In essence, what PFA] accomplished was to provide a formal context based on the notions of nite set and predicative class and on prima-facie evident principles for such, in which could be established the existence and categoricity of a natural number structure. The following reviews, in looser formal terms than PFA], the notions and results therein prior to any discussion of their philosophical signi cance. Three formal systems were introduced in PFA], denoted EFS, EFSC and EFSC*, resp. All are formulated within classical logic. The language L(EFS), has two kinds of variables:
Individual variables : a; b; c; u; v; w; x; y; z; :: :; and Finite set variables : A; B; C; F; G; H; :: :
The intended interpretation is that the latter range over nite sets of individuals. There is one binary operation symbol (,) for a pairing function on individuals, and individual terms s,t,: : : are generated from the individual variables by means of this operation. We have two relation symbols, = and 2, by means of which atomic formulas of the form s = t and s 2 A are obtained. Formulas '; ; : : : are generated from these by the propositional operations :; &; _; !, and by the quanti ers 8 and 9 applied to either kind of variable. The language L(EFSC), which is the same as that of EFSC*, adds a third kind of variable:
Class variables: X,Y,Z,: : : 1 In this extended language, we also have a membership relation between individuals and classes, giving further atomic formulas of the form s 2 X. Then formulas in L(EFSC) are generated as before, allowing, in addition, quantication over classes. A formula of this extended language is said to be weak second-order if it contains no bound class variables. The intended range of the class variables is the collection of weak second-order de nable classes of individuals. We could consider nite sets to be among the classes, but did not make that identi cation in PFA]. Instead we write A = X if A and X have the same extension. Similarly, we explain when a class is a subclass of a set, and so on.
A class X is said to be nite and we write Fin(X) if 9A(A = X).
The Axioms of EFS are denoted (Sep), (FS-I), (FS-II), (P-I) and (P-II), resp.; these are explained as follows. The separation scheme (Sep) asserts that any de nable subset of a nite set is nite, i.e. for each formula ' of EFS, fx 2 Aj'(x)g is a nite set B when A is a given nite set. (FS-I) asserts the existence of an empty ( nite) set, and (FS-II) tells us that if A is a nite set and 1 The class variables are given in boldface, to distinguish them from the nite set variables. a is any individual then A fag is a nite set. The pairing axioms (P-I) and (P-II) respectively say that pairing is one-one and that there is an urelement under pairing; it is convenient to introduce the symbol 0 for an individual which is not a pair.
The Axioms of EFSC augment those of EFS by the scheme (WS-CA) for weak second-order comprehension axiom, which tells us that fxj'(x)g is a class X for any weak second-order '. In this language, we allow the formula ' in (Sep) to contain free class variables; then it can be replaced by the assertion that any subclass of a nite set is nite. The following theorem (numbered 1 in PFA]) is easily proved by a model-theoretic argument, but can also be given a nitary proof-theoretic argument.
METATHEOREM. EFSC is a conservative extension of EFS.
In the language of EFSC, (binary) relations are identi ed with classes of ordered pairs, and functions, for which we use the letters f; g;: : :; 2 are identi ed with many-one relations; n-ary functions reduce to unary functions of n-tuples. Then we can formulate the notion of Dedekind nite class as being an X such that there is no one-one map from X to a proper subclass of X. By the axiom (Card)
is meant the statement that every (truly) nite class is Dedekind nite. The Axioms of EFSC* are then the same as those of EFSC, with the additional axiom (Card). Now, working in EFSC, we de ned a triple hM; a; gi to be a pre-N-structure if it satis es the following two conditions:
(N-I) 8x 2 M g(x) 6 = a]; and
These are the usual rst two Peano axioms when a is 0 and g is the successor operation. By an N-structure is meant a pre-N-structure which satis es the axiom of induction in the form:
It is proved in EFSC that we can de ne functions by primitive recursion on any N-structure; the idea is simply to obtain such as the union of nite approximations. This union is thus de nable in a weak second-order way. From that, we readily obtain the following theorem (numbered 5 in PFA]):
THEOREM (Categoricity, in EFSC) Any two N-structures are isomorphic.
Now to obtain the existence of N-structures, in PFA] we began with a speci c pre-N-structure hV; 0; si, where V = fxjx = xg and s(x) = x 0 = (x; 0); that this satis es (N-I) and (N-II) is readily seen from the axioms (P-II) and (P-I), resp. Next, de ne Clos ? (A) $ 8x x 0 2 A ! x 2 A];
(1) and
In words, Clos ? (A) is read as saying that A is closed under the predecessor operation (when applicable), and so y x holds if y belongs to every nite set which contains x and is closed under the predecessor operation. Let
Pd(x) = fyjy xg:
The next step in PFA] was to cut down the structure hV; 0; si to a special pre-N-structure: THEOREM (Existence, in EFSC*) hM; 0; si is an N-structure.
To summarize: in PFA], categoricity of N-structures was established in EFSC and existence in EFSC*. Following publication of this work we learned from Peter Aczel of a simple improvement of the latter result obtained by taking in place of M the following class:
THEOREM (Aczel) . EFSC proves that hN; 0; si is an N-structure.
We provide the proof of this here, using facts established in Theorem 2 of PFA].
(i) 0 2 N, because Pd(0) = f0g and 0 0.
(ii) x 2 N ! x 0 2 N, because Pd(x 0 ) = Pd(x) fx 0 g, and 0 x ! 0 x 0 . (iii) If X is any subclass of N and 0 2 X^8 y y 2 X ! y 0 2 X] then X = N. For, suppose that there is some x 2 N with x = 2 X. Let A = fyjy x & y = 2 Xg; A is nite since it is a subclass of the nite set Pd(x). Moreover, A is closed under predecessor, so A contains every y x; in particular, 0 2 A, which contradicts 0 2 X.
The theorem follows from (i)-(iii), since the axioms (N-I) and (N-II) hold on V and hence on N.
It was proved in PFA] that EFSC* is of the same (proof-theoretic) strength as the system PA of Peano Axioms and is a conservative extension of the latter under a suitable interpretation. The argument was that EFSC* is interpretable in the system ACA 0 , which is a well-known second-order conservative extension of PA based on the arithmetical comprehension axiom scheme together with induction axiom in the form (N-III). Conversely, we can develop PA in EFSC* using closure under primitive recursion on any N-structure. Since any rstorder formula of arithmetic so interpreted then de nes a class, we obtain the full induction scheme for PA in EFSC*. Now, using the preceding result, the whole argument applies mutatis mutandis to obtain the following:
METATHEOREM (Aczel) . EFSC is of the same (proof-theoretic)strength as PA and is a conservative extension of PA under the interpretation of the latter in EFSC.
This result also served to answer Question 1 on p. 13 of PFA].
Incidentally, it may be seen that the de nition of N in (5) For, the rst conjunct here is equivalent to the statement that 0 x, and the second to Fin(Pd(x)). In this form, Aczel's de nition is simply the same as the one proposed by George (1987), p. 515. 3 Part of the progress that is achieved by this work in our framework is to bring out clearly the assumptions about nite sets which are needed for it and which are prima-facie evident for that notion.
There is one further improvement in our work to mention. It emerged from correspondence with Alexander George and Daniel Velleman that the remark in Footnote 5 on p. 16 of PFA] asserting a relationship of our work with a de nition of the natural numbers credited to Dummett was obscure. The exact situation has now been clari ed by Geo rey Hellman in the Appendix to this paper, where it is shown that Dummet's de nition also yields an N-structure, provably in EFSC.
2 The structuralist standpoint and \construct-ing the natural numbers"
In developing predicative foundations of arithmetic, we have been proceeding from a structuralist standpoint, one which each of us has pursued independently in other contexts. In general terms, structuralism has been described by one of us as the view that \mathematics is the free exploration of structural possibilities, pursued by (more or less) rigorous deductive means" (Hellman, 1989, p.6) , along with the claim that, In mathematics, it is not particular objects which matter but rather certain`structural' properties and relations, both within and among relevant totalities. (Hellman, 1996 , p. 101) Such general formulations raise questions of scope, for it seems that there must be exceptional mathematical concepts requiring a non-structural or prestructural understanding so that prior sense can be made of \items in a structure", substructure, and other concepts required for structuralism to get started. 4 For present purposes, however, this question need not be taken up in a general way, as we may work within a more specialized form of structuralism, one explicitly concerned with number systems. As the other of us has put it:
The rst task of any general foundational scheme for mathematics is to establish the number systems. In both the extensional and intensional approach this is done from the modern structuralist point of view. The structuralist viewpoint as regards the basic number systems is that it is not the speci c nature of the individual objects which is of the essence, but rather the isomorphism type of the structure of which they form a part. Each structure A is to be characterized up to isomorphism by a structural property P which, logically , may be of rst order or of higher order. (Feferman, 1985, p. 48 ) So long as this is understood, we may work with a system such as EFSC, leaving open whether this itself is to be embedded in a more general structuralist framework or whether it is thought of as standing on its own.
The central point here is that what we are seeking to de ne in a predicatively acceptable way is not, strictly speaking, the predicate`natural number' simpliciter, but rather the predicate`natural-number-type structure'. That is we seek to characterize what it is to be a structure of this particular type | what Dedekind (1888) called \simply in nite systems" and what set-theorists call \!-sequences" | and also to prove that, mathematically, such structures exist. Once this has been accomplished, we may then, as a fa con de parler, identify the elements of a particular such structure as \the natural numbers", employing standard numerals and designations of functions and relations, but this is essentially for mathematical convenience. O cially we eliminate the predicatè is a natural number' in its absolute sense and speak instead of what holds in any natural-number-type structure. And thanks to our (limited) second-order logical machinery, we can render arithmetical statements directly, relativized to structures, as illustrated by the conditions (N-I)-(N-III) (sec. 1, above); there is no need to introduce a relation of satisfaction between structures and sentences.
This standpoint has some implications worth noting. First, since no absolute meaning is being assigned to`natural number', the same goes for`non-number'. While of course a good de nition of`natural-number-type structure' must rule out anything that does not qualify as such a structure, there is simply no problem of \excluding non-numbers" such as Julius Caesar (on standard platonist conceptions). This notorious Fregean problem simply does not arise in the structuralist setting. Rather than having to answer the question, \Is Julius Caesar a number?" ( and presumably get the right answer), we sidestep it entirely. We even regard it as misleading to ask, \Might Julius Caesar be or have been a number?" for this still employs`number' in an absolute sense. Of course, Julius Caesar might have been | and presumably is, in a mathematical sense | a member of many natural-number-type structures. On the other hand, we can make sense of standard, mathematically sensible statements such as \3/5 is not a natural number" by writing out \In any structure for the rationals with a substructure for the natural numbers (identi ed in the usual way), the object denoted`3/5' does not belong to the domain of the latter". And, of course, many elliptical references to \the natural numbers" are harmless.
More signi cantly, the whole question of circularity in \constructions of the natural numbers" must be looked at afresh. In contrast to`natural number', natural-number-type structure' is an in nitistic concept in the straightforward sense that any instance of such a structure has an in nite domain with (at least) a successor-type operation de ned on it. While it might well appear circular to de ne`natural number' in terms of a predicate applying to just nite objects | e.g. nite sets or sequences from some chosen domain | since it might seem obvious that such objects can do the duty of natural numbers, nevertheless if one succeeds in building up an in nite structure of just the right sort from nite objects, using acceptable methods of construction, and then proves by acceptable means that one has succeeded, prima facie one has done as much as could reasonably be demanded.
In predicative foundations, it is quite natural to take the notion` nite set' as given, governed by elementary closure conditions as in EFSC. The cogency of this can be seen as follows. Within the de nitionist framework, a predicatively acceptable domain is one in which each item is speci ed by a designator, say in a mathematical language. Hence any nite subset of the domain is speci cable outright by a disjunction of the form x = d 1 _ x = d 2 _ : : :_x = d k , where each d i is a designator of an object in the domain. Thus, the nite sets correspond to nite lists of designators, and it is reasonable for the de nitionist to take this notion | \ nite list of quasi-concrete objects" | as understood. The claim is, along Hilbertian lines, that this does not depend on a grasp of the in nite structure of natural numbers; nor does it depend on an explicit understanding of the even more complex in nite structure of nite subsets ordered, say, by inclusion. Once given such a starting point, the closure conditions of EFSC are then evident.
There is a further related point of comparison between the concepts` nite set' and`natural number' that is relevant to our project. Given an in nite domain X of objects, we think of a nite set A of X's as fully determined by its members. Although certain relations to other nite sets of X's are also evident for us | e.g. adjoining any new element to A yields a nite set | the identity of A as a nite set is not conceived as depending on its position in an in nite structure of nite sets of X's. Yet this \self-standing" character of nite sets is not shared by natural numbers, even on platonist views. To identify a natural number is to identify its position in an in nite structure. Even on a set-theoretic construction, while the sets taken as numbers are of course determined as sets by their members they are not determined as numbers until their position in a sequence is determined. Such considerations lead naturally to the structuralist project of PFA].
The signi cance of these points has perhaps not been su ciently appreciated because, historically, structuralism has not been articulated independently of platonism. If one succeeds in de ning`natural number' platonistically, say as Frege or Russell did, or as Zermelo or von Neumann did, so that the natural numbers are identi ed uniquely with particular abstract objects, then, since the whole sequence of natural numbers thus de ned together with arithmetic functions and relations are unproblematic as objects in such frameworks, it is a trivial matter to pass to an explicit de nition of`natural-number-type structure': one simply speci es as such a structure any which is isomorphic to the original, privileged one. Then clearly all the work has gone into the original de nition of`natural number', and questions of circularity are directed there. However, the approach of PFA] is di erent, sharing more with Hilbert's conception of mathematical axioms and reference than with Frege's. 5 For we bypass construction of`the natural numbers' as particular objects and proceed directly to the in nitistic concept,`natural-number-type structure' (much as Dedekind (1888) proceeded directly to de ne`simply in nite system'). Then, in proving the existence of such structures, we introduce a certain sequence of nite objects available within our framework. Collecting these is predicatively unproblematic, for they are speci ed as having nitely many earlier elements (including an initial one), not as ful lling mathematical induction. That they satisfy induction is then proved as a theorem. 6 5 For a valuable discussion of Hilbert's structuralist views of axioms and reference in mathematics and the contrast with Frege's views, see Hallett (1990) . 6 Our construction thus improves on Dedekind's, for he relied, for a Dedekind-in nite system, on a totality | of \all things which can be objects of my thought" (Dedekind (1888) , Theorem 66) | which, even apart from its unmathematical character, is unacceptable to a predicativist on logical grounds, for, presumably, such a totality would contain itself! Furthermore, for a simply in nite system, he then relied on a subtotality impredicatively speci ed as the intersection of all subtotalities containing an initial element and closed under the given function (op. cit. , Theorems 72 and 44). But it is noteworthy that the particular example which Dedekind sought to invoke to insure non-vacuity of his de nitions was not identi ed as Despite this result and the related ones established in PFA] | especially the categoricity of our characterization and the proof-theoretic conservativeness of our system over PA | questions have been raised, implicitly and explicitly, concerning circularity and possible hidden impredicativity in the constructions. In the remaining two sections, we will address these speci cally.
Parsons' challenge
In his stimulating paper`The impredicativity of induction' ( I of I] in the following), Charles Parsons takes up a number of issues in his typically thoughtful and thorough manner. Our main purpose here is to address the points most directly related as a challenge to what PFA] was intended to accomplish, namely a predicative foundation of the structure of natural numbers, given the notion of nite set of individuals. 7 But it is necessary, rst, to make some distinctions in regard to the idea of predicativity. To begin with, a putative de nition of an object c is said to be impredicative if it makes use of bound variables whose range includes c as one of its possible values. 8 Such bound variables may appear attached to quanti ers, or as the variable of abstraction in de nitions of sets or functions, or as the variable in a unique description operator, and so on. We do not agree with the position ascribed to Poincar e and Weyl 9 , that impredicative de nitions are prima-facie viciously circular and to be avoided. For example, we regard the number associated with the Waring problem for cubes | de ned as the least positive integer n such that every su ciently large integer is a sum of at most n positive cubes | as a perfectly meaningful and non-circular description of a speci c integer; it is known that n 7, but beyond that the exact value of n is not known. While this de nition would generally be considered non-constructive, and is impredicative according to the general idea given above, from a classical predicative point of view it is not viciously circular, since we are convinced by predicative arguments that such a number exists and must have an alternative predicative de nition, be it 7 or a smaller integer. So, for us, the issue is to determine when there is a predicative warrant for accepting a prima-facie impredicative de nition. That cannot be answered without saying what constitutes a predicative proof of existence of objects of one kind or another. Moreover, the above explanation of what it is about the form of a putative de nition that makes it impredicative does not tell us what constitutes a predicative de nition, because it only tells us what should not \the numbers". As it happened, Dedekind did go on to speak of such abstract particulars, but that is another story; and, in any case, it is a further move which we have not been tempted to make. 7 Parsons' paper appeared well before PFA], so the challenge was not issued to it but rather to the kind of program which it exempli es. That challenge was addressed brie y in the nal discussion section of PFA], pp. 14-15, but is expanded on substantially here. 8 The informal explanation of what constitutes an impredicative de nition varies from author to author. A representative collection of quotations is given in George (1987) ; the explanation given in the text here is closest to that taken by George from an article of Hintikka (1956 Since the latter have to be, in some sense, prior to the object being de ned, and since it is not asserted in explaining what is to be avoided just what that is, an answer to this necessarily makes of predicativity a relative rather than an absolute notion. Considerations such as this led Kreisel to propose a formal notion of predicative provability given the natural numbers, and that was characterized in precise proof-theoretical terms independently (and in agreement with each other) by Feferman (1964) and Sch utte (1965) . Speaking informally, that characterization takes for granted the notions and laws of classical logic as applied to de nitions and statements involving, to begin with, only the natural numbers as the range of bound variables in de nitions of sets of natural numbers, and then admits, successively, de nitions employing variables for sets ranging over collections of sets which have been comprehended predicatively. 10 The details need not concern us; su ce it to say that Parsons, among others, has found this analysis of predicativity given the natural numbers to be persuasive ( I of I] p. 150). However, as he suggests in the latter part of I of I],he also nds it reasonable to ascribe the term`predicative' to the use of certain generalized inductive de nitions that breach the bounds of the Feferman-Sch utte characterization. There is no contradiction here from our point of view; the latter simply shifts what the notion of predicativity is taken relative to. One might go farther and consider a notion of predicativity relative to the structure of real numbers, if one regarded that structure as well-determined, and so on to higher levels of set theory. Though the idea is clear enough, none of these has been studied and characterized in precise proof-theoretical terms. 11 Now, nally, we return to the program of PFA]. There the aim is to consider what can be done predicatively in the foundations of arithmetic relative to the notion of nite set of individuals, where the individuals themselves may have some structure as built up by ordered pairs. 12 Philosophically, the signi cance of this is that we have a prior conception of nite set that does not require the understanding of the natural number system, and for this notion we have some evident closure principles, which are simply expressed by the axioms (Sep), (FS-I) and (FS-II) of PFA]. We do not regard the success of the program PFA] to be necessary for the acceptance of the natural number system, but believe that its success, if granted, is of philosophical interest.
The challenge raised by Parsons in I of I] begins with the evident impredicativity of Frege's de nition of the natural numbers, in the form: 10 To be more precise, this is spelled out by means of an autonomous trans nite progression of rami ed systems, where autonomy is a boot-strap condition which restricts one to those trans nite levels which have a prior predicative justi cation; cf. Feferman (1964) . 11 The relative notion of predicativity is recast in Feferman (1996) in terms of a formal notion of the unfolding of a schematic theory, which is supposed to tell us what more should be accepted once we have accepted basic notions and principles. 12 Parsons has an interestingdiscussion in I of I] pp. 143-145, of what is reasonable to assume about the range of rst-order variables in proposed de nitions of the natural numbers. We believe the assumptions (P-I) and (P-II) are innocuous, in the sense that the notion of ordered pair is a prerequisite to an understanding of any abstract mathematics.
(Frege-N) Na $ 8PfP0 & 8x(Px ! P(Sx) ) ! Pag; where the variable`P' is supposed to range over \arbitrary" second-order entities in some sense or other (Fregean concepts, predicates, propositional functions, sets, classes, attributes, etc.), including, among others, the entity N supposedly being de ned. But Parsons enlarges on what constitutes the impredicativity of Frege's de nitions in that he says that in order to use it to derive induction in the form (say) of a rule,
we must allow instantiation of the variable`P' in (Frege-N) by formulas '(x) which may contain the predicate \N". In this sense, the focus of Parsons' discussion is on the impredicativity of induction, rather than the prima-facie impredicativity of the putative de nition (Frege-N). He expands the implications of this still further as follows:
The thesis of the present note is that the impredicativity that arises from Frege's attempt to reduce induction to a de nition is not a mere artifact of Frege's strategy of reduction. As Michael Dummett observed some years ago, the impredicativity | though not necessarily impredicative second-order logic | remains if we regard induction in a looser way as part of the explanation of the term`natural number'. If one explains the notion of natural number in such a way that induction falls out of the explanation, then one will be left with a similar impredicativity. ( I of I] p. 141; the reference is to Dummett (1978) p. 199 .) Perhaps what we were up to in PFA] is orthogonal to the issue as posed in this way by Parsons, but let us see what we can do to relate the two. First of all, as explained in the preceding section, what we are not after is a de nition of the notion of natural number in the traditional sense in which this is conceived, but rather it is to establish the existence (and uniqueness, up to isomorphism) of a natural-number-structure, or N-structure (as it was abbreviated, op. cit.). Secondly, induction in the form of the principle (N-III) of Section 1 above is taken to be part of what constitutes an N-structure. We agree with Parsons ( I of I] p. 145), that \ s]tated as a general principle, induction is about`all predicates' ", but we do not agree with the conclusion that he draws (loc. cit) that \ i]nduction is thus inherently impredicative, because ... we cannot apply it without taking predicates involving quanti cation over the domain of natural numbers] as instances." Rather our position is that our | or, perhaps better, Aczel's | proof of the existence (and categoricity) of an N-structure is predicative, given the notion of arbitrary nite set of individuals, and thence in any such structure we may apply induction to any formula which is recognized to de ne a class in our framework, including formulas which refer to the particular de nition of our N-structure. Speci cally, within EFSC these are the weak second-order formulas, in which only quanti cation over individuals and nite sets is permitted. Of course, if we want to apply induction to more general classes of formulas in our system, or to formulas in more extensive systems, the question of predicativity has to be reexamined on a case-by-case basis. For example, if we expand the system EFSC by a principle which says that in any N-structure we may apply induction to arbitrary formulas of L(EFSC), the resulting system EFSC+FI is no longer evidently predicative given the notion of nite set, but it is so nonetheless. The reason is that EFSC+FI can be interpreted in the system ACA with full second-order induction | which is predicative given the natural numbers according to the Feferman-Sch utte characterization. And since, on our analysis, the natural numbers are predicative given the nite sets, this also justi es EFSC+FI on that same basis. Naturally, one may expect that if the language is expanded by introducing terms for impredicatively dened sets (speci ed by suitable instances of the comprehension axiom), or if one adds impredicative higher type or set-theoretical concepts, then the expanded instances of induction which become available will take us beyond the predicative, whether considered relative to the natural numbers or to nite sets. 13 But this can't be counted as an objection to what is accomplished in PFA]. It is not the general principle of induction which is impredicative, but only various of its instances; and those instances which Parsons argues to be impredicative, in the above quotation, are not examples of such, granted the notion of nite set. Now, nally, and relatedly, we take up the objection that Parsons raises in I of I] pp. 146-168 to the predicativity of Alexander George's (1987) revision of Quine's de nition of the natural numbers using quanti cation over nite sets, which is equivalent to Aczel's de nition of an N-structure as we pointed out in Section 1 above. Of this he says: \To the claim that the Quinean de nition of the natural numbers is predicative, one can also reply that it is so only because the notion of nite set is assumed." Indeed, as the above discussion a rms, we could not agree more. But the reason for his objection then is that \ o]nce one allows oneself the notion of nite set, it seems one should be allowed to use some basic forms of reasoning concerning nite sets", and in particular (according to Parsons) of induction and recursion on nite sets, which would then allow one to de ne the natural numbers as the cardinal numbers of nite sets. But it is just this that we do not assume in EFSC (or EFSC*); no assumptions are made on nite sets besides the closure principles (Sep), (FS-I) and FS-II) (and (Card) in the case of EFSC*). Of course, within our system, once we have an N-structure, we can formally de ne what it means to be a nite set by saying that it is in one-one correspondence with an initial segment of that structure, and then derive principles of induction and recursion for that notion. But we cannot prove that these exhaust the range of the nite-set variables.
The challenge of George and Velleman
In their 1996 paper, \Two conceptions of natural number" ( TC] in the following), Alexander George and Daniel Velleman take up the PFA] constructions in connection with two main conceptions of natural number, which they describe as \pair down" (\PD") and \build up" (\BU") corresponding to two ways of characterizing the minimal closure of a set A under an operation f. On the PD approach, this is de ned explicitly as the intersection of all sets including A and closed under f. In the case of the natural numbers, this corresponds to the de nitions given by Dedekind, Frege, and Russell, essentially as the intersection of all classes containing zero and closed under successor. In contrast, the BU approach provides an inductive de nition, illustrated in the case of the natural numbers by clauses such as,
(1) 0 is a natural number, and (2) If n is a natural number, then so is S(n), together with an extremal clause which says that natural numbers are only those objects generated by these rules. As their discussion brings out, the PD approach comports with a platonist view, according to which impredicative de nitions are legitimate means of picking out independently existing sets, whereas the BU approach comports with a constructivist view which rejects the platonist stance and impredicative de nitions in favor of rules for generating the intended set of objects. Not surprisingly, neither camp is satis ed with the other's approach, the constructivist rejecting the PD approach as just indicated, but the platonist also rejecting the BU approach as failing properly to de ne the intended class by failing explicitly to capture the required notion of \ nite iteration" of the rules of construction. Furthermore, neither camp is impressed with the other's critique. And so the impasse persists.
The question arises for George and Velleman, to which type of de nition should that of PFA] be assimilated? As they recognize, it seeks to avoid impredicativity and so surely should not be thought of as a PD de nition. On the other hand, in PFA] \the completed in nite" is recognized; moreover (although George and Velleman do not highlight this), an explicit de nition of \natural-number-type structure" is provided, not merely an inductive or recursive description of \natural numbers", and so assimilation of PFA] to the BU approach is misleading. Here we would suggest that a new, third category of de nition be recognized, one which combines the explicitness demanded by PD with the predicative methods demanded by BU; it might be called \predicative structuralist" (\PS"), if one wants a two-lettered label. But before recognizing a qualitatively new product, one wants to be sure that at least the labelling is honest and accurate.
In notes, George and Velleman raise questions on this score. The essential worry seems to be that the construction in PFA] (or its simpli cation by Aczel) succeeds only if the range of the nite-set quanti ers is restricted to truly nite sets; otherwise, \non-standard numbers" will not be excluded. But, for some reason, any e ort to impose this restriction must appear circular or involve some hidden impredicativity. They put it this way:
As Daniel Isaacson (1987) suggests, the predicativist de nition will be successful only if (i) the second-order quanti er in the de nition ranges over a domain that includes all nite initial segments of N and (ii) the domain contains no in nite sets. He concludes that the de nition therefore \does not fare signi cantly better on the score of avoiding impredicativity than the one based on full second-order logic" (p. 156). Feferman and Hellman argue in response (1995, note 5, p. 16 ) that the existence of the required nite initial segments can be justi ed predicatively, but it seems to us that they have failed to answer part (ii) of Isaacson's objection, namely that in nite sets must be excluded from the domain of quanti cation. As we saw earlier, it is this exclusion of in nite sets from the second-order domain that guarantees that Feferman and Hellman's de nition will capture only natural numbers. In fact, the di culty here is in e ect the same as the di culty that the platonist nds with the BU de nition; it is not the inclusion of desired elements in the domain that causes problems, but rather the exclusion of unwanted elements.
( TC], n. 9) Now an adequate response to this requires distinguishing what may be called \external" and \internal" viewpoints concerning formalization of mathematics. From an external standpoint, one views a formalization from the outside and asks whether and how non-standard models of axioms or de ning conditions can be ruled out. Here the metamathematical facts are clear. So long as one works with a consistent formal system based on a (possibly many-sorted) rst-order logic, or indeed any logic which is compact, non-standard models of arithmetic are inevitable. But this is true even if an impredicative de nition of \N-structure" is given. Even a PD de nition in ZFC is subject to this limitation and will have realizations in which \numbers" with in nitely many predecessors appear. No extent of analysis of` nite' or`standard number', etc., can overcome this limitation. What this shows is that the problem of \excluding non-standard models" in this sense is \orthogonal", so to speak, to the problem of predicativity. All formal de nitions are in the same boat, and the only recourse, from the external vantage point, is somehow to transcend the framework of rst-order logic. Let us return to this momentarily.
Alternatively, one can look at matters from an internal point of view. One accepts the inevitability of non-standard models of theories built on formal logic, but then one attempts to lay down axioms which are intuitively evident of the informal notions one is trying to capture, and then one seeks to prove the strongest theorems one can which, on their ordinary informal interpretation, express interesting and desirable results. Thus, one can lay down closure conditions, as in PFA], which are evident of nite sets, and, although they can hold of other collections as well, the theorems one proves, such as mathematical induction in speci ed pre-N-structures, establish desired results even if they can be non-standardly interpreted. (Bear in mind that every mathematical result about the continuum, say, recovered in ZFC has non-standard interpretations.) Indeed, on this score, a good case can be made that the predicativist can prove results on the existence and uniqueness of natural-number-type structures which are just as decisive as those the classicist can prove. Let us return to this after elaborating a bit further what can be said on behalf of PFA] and the improvements described in Section 1 from the external viewpoint.
In order to e ect the desired \exclusion of in nite sets" that can lead to \non-standard numbers", i.e., elements of N-structures with in nitely many predecessors, one takes the bull by the horns, so to speak: the exclusion is imposed by at in the metalanguage by stipulating that we are only concerned with interpretations in which the range of the nite-set quanti ers contains only nite sets.`Finite' is taken as absolute. This is the framework of \weak secondorder logic" in its semantical sense. As it is well known, it is non-compact and not recursively axiomatizable, but this is o set by gains in expressive power, exploited in PFA]. For now one can collect items of a pre-N-structure which correspond to genuinely nite initial segments of a linear ordering, and this su ces to characterize N-structures.
There is a limited analogy with the classicists's approach via PD de nitions, e.g. those of Dedekind, Frege, and Russell, formalized say in second-order notation; for these characterize N-structures only if non-standard, less-thanfull ranges of the second-order quanti ers are excluded (so that second-order monadic quanti ers must range over all subsets of the domain, excluding Henkin models). The problem of non-standard models is overcome by moving to noncompact, non-axiomatizable \full second-order logic". But the analogy is only partial. For, whereas the classical logicist excludes non-full interpretations on the basis of a claim to understand \all subsets of an in nite set", the predicative logicist merely excludes in nite sets from the range of nite-set quanti ers on the basis of a claim to understand`all nite subsets'. If the objection is that this is illegitimate because` nite' \is as much in need of analysis as the concept natural number'" ( TC] n. 9), then it is appropriate to refer back to Section 2, above, and the whole case for grounding the in nitistic notion of \natural-number-type structure" on elementary assumptions on nite objects, together with the point made above (Section 3) that nowhere do we have to invoke niteset induction in order to prove any of our theorems, including the theorem that says that mathematical induction holds in any special pre-N-structure. (Mutatis mutandis for the Aczel theorem.) Indeed, since induction is essential to the natural-number concept and to reasoning \about the natural numbers", the very fact that nite-set induction is not needed to recover this much counts in favor of the view that` nite set' is actually less in need of analysis than`natural number'.
Moreover, on the question of existence, there is a fundamental disanalogy between the PD and the PS approaches. For, as George and Velleman bring out, the impredicative de nitions of the logicists still must presuppose existence of the minimal closure, and this is an additional assumption, not guaranteed merely by the restriction to full interpretations. There still must be some full interpretation of the right sort, i.e. containing the real minimal closure. In contrast, the predicative constructions of PFA], Aczel, and the Appendix below yield the desired classes by a restricted comprehension principle, (WS-CA). Given nite sets as objects, such a principle is justi ed much as arithmetical comprehension is; one can even eliminate talk of classes of individuals in favor of satisfaction of formulas, since these contain only bound individual and nite-set variables but no bound class variables.
Thus, the predicative logicist accompanies the platonist classicist only a relatively small step beyond rst-order logic; then construction takes over on the new higher ground, while the platonist continues ascending, eventually into the clouds.
Consistently with this external view, one can, however, also pursue the internalist course of proving desirable theorems. Here, perhaps surprisingly, the predicativist is able to recover predicativist analogues of well-known classical results. The proofs of categoricity or unicity of N-structures and of mathematical induction in the pre-N-structures of PFA], Aczel, and the Appendix already illustrate this. But one can go further and prove theorems which, informally understood, say explicitly that N-structures cannot contain any non-standard elements. The idea is to formalize the following, familiar reasoning. Let hM; 0; 0 i be an N-structure. Induction implies than any non-empty class (subclass of M) But in what system is the above reasoning carried out? If we attempt to formalize it in EFSC, expressing \x is non-standard" by \8A(A 6 = fy : y xg", we immediately contradict the de nition of M! On the other hand, we cannot simply plug in \fy : y xg is Dedekind-in nite" or any other second-order analysis of \in nite" involving general class or function quanti ers, for then we would not be able predicatively to form the class K. However, there is an alternative method which gets around this. For here we may appeal to the metatheorem mentioned above in Section 3: If we add to EFSC the axiom schema known as \full induction", \FI", that is, induction for arbitrary second-order formulas, the resulting system, EFSC + FI, is interpretable in the subsystem of PA 2 known as ACA. This also contains FI and is, moreover, a predicatively acceptable system relative to the natural numbers (on the Feferman-Sch utte characterization) as noted above in Section 3. But, as was also observed there, since the natural numbers or N-structures are predicative given the nite sets, EFSC+FI is also predicatively acceptable relative to the nite sets. Although it cannot prove the existence of subclasses of an N-structure de ned by formulas with class quanti ers, it can prove that induction holds directly for any formula that platonistically de nes a subclass, as it were. In particular, now one can formalize the above induction ruling out non-standard numbers, using, in place of x 2 K', a second-order formula '(x) to express \x has in nitely many predecessors", e.g. \the predecessors of x form a class a subclass of which is in one-one correspondence with an unbounded subclass of M"; or it could just as well be \the predecessors of x form a Dedekind-in nite class". The predicativist, as well as the classicist, regards these as good formalizations of the intended notion. Thus, the reasoning is formalizable in a predicatively acceptable extension of EFSC without appealing to the special nite-set variables and without any circular or impredicative reference to the class K. 14 Looking at the contrapositive, one sees that one has thus derived the consequence of the axiom (Card) directly relevant to ruling out non-standard members of N-structures, viz. the statement that the predecessors of any such element form a Dedekind-nite set,
This follows straightforwardly by induction on the formula, '(z), expressing Ded Fin(Pd (z) ). Again, we need not be able to collect all elements satisfying this formula in order to reason with it by mathematical induction.
Thus, \non-standard numbers" are ruled out as decisively as they can be. From the external standpoint, they are excluded by the semantics of weak second-order logic, which, as has been argued, is a good framework for elementary predicative mathematics. From an internal perspective, without falling back on special nite-set variables, we can employ standard, logicist analyses of nite',`in nite', and so forth, and derive theorems in predicatively acceptable systems which directly express the desired exclusion. This may seem like \hav-ing one's cake and eating it at the same time". But really it's more like having two desserts.
14 There is some irony in the fact that George and Velleman, after claiming ( TC] n. 10) that the Aczel construction cannot rule out non-standard numbers without a circular appeal to \the complement of N", present an argument of their own for the predicative acceptability of an extension of EFSC* in which the full induction schema is derivable. (See their n. 14.) They argue for a direct extension to include the Separation schema for nite sets with arbitrary second-order formulas. This is closely related to the fact that, in a weak subsystem of analysis, full induction FI is equivalent to the so-called \bounded comprehension scheme", 8n9X8m(m 2 X $ m < n & '(m) ); where '(m) is any formula of second-order arithmetic (lacking free`X'). (See Simpson (1985) , p. 150.) This corresponds to the Separation scheme for nite sets with arbitrary second-order formulas. We prefer the direct route to full induction via ACA and proof theory, since it is predicatively problematic to say that an arbitrary formula \speci es unambiguously which elements of the given] nite set are to be included in a subset" ( TC], n. 14). It then turns out that their proposed stronger Separation scheme is derivable from full induction, and so inherits a predicative justi cation after all. In any case, once full induction is available, the reasoning that N-structures are truly standard is predicatively formalizable without appeal to nite-set variables, even while employing a standard logicist analysis of` nite' or`in nite' as just indicated. 
